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• Purpose:	Examine	issues	related	to	the	operation	of	the	Phase	1	DAA	
system	within	a	Class	D	terminal	area.	The	following	operations	were	
performed:
– Instrument	approach
– Visual	approach
– Visual	pattern
• Objectives:
– Characterize	pilot	and	Phase	1	DAA	system	performance	while	conducting	
terminal	area	operations
– Investigate	the	effect	of	changes	to	the	alerting	and	guidance	structure	
intended	to	minimize	frequency	of	alerts
– Investigate	the	effect	of	the	location	of	an	encounter	on	pilot	responses
Objective
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• One-Way	Between	Subjects	Factorial
– Independent	Variable:	
• Level	of	DAA	System	Alerting	&	Guidance	(Between-subjects)
– D1	=	No	corrective	or	warning	DAA	alert;	no	DAA	guidance
– D2	=	No	corrective	DAA	alert;	DAA	warning	guidance	only
– D3	=	Full	Phase	1	MOPS	DAA	alerting	and	guidance	(Class	I)
– Embedded	Variables:
• Ownship	approach	type
– Instrument
– Visual
– Traffic	Pattern
• Encounter	location
– Early	(before	final)	
– Late	(on	final)
Experimental	Design
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Experimental	Design
Symbol Name
Warning	Alert
Corrective	Alert
Preventive	Alert
Guidance	Traffic
Remaining	Traffic
Symbol Name
Warning	Alert
Preventive	Alert
Remaining	Traffic
D3
Symbol Name
Preventive	Alert
Remaining	Traffic
All Remain	&	Regain	
DWC	Guidance
Warning	Remain	
DWC	Guidance	Only
No Guidance
D1 D2
Note:	used	instantaneous	turn	
assumption	to	generate	guidance
Phase	1	MOPS	Alerting	Criteria
5
Symbol Name Pilot	Action DAA	Well	Clear	Criteria Time to	Loss	of	DAA	Well	Clear
Aural	Alert
Verbiage
4 Warning	Alert • Notify ATC	as	soon	as	practicable	after	taking	action
DMOD	=	0.66	nmi
HMD	=	0.66	nmi
ZTHR	=	450	ft
modTau	=	35	sec
25	sec
“Traffic,	
Maneuver Now”		
x2
3 Corrective	Alert
• Coordinate	with	ATC	to	
determine	an	appropriate	
maneuver
DMOD	=	0.66	nmi
HMD		= 0.66	nmi
ZTHR	=	450	ft
modTau	=	35	sec
55	sec “Traffic, Avoid”
2 Preventive	Alert • On	current	course,	correctiveaction should	not	be	required
DMOD	=	0.66	nmi
HMD	=	0.66	nmi
ZTHR	=	700	ft
modTau	=	35	sec
55	sec “Traffic,	Monitor”
1 Guidance	Traffic
• Traffic	generating	guidance	
bands	outside	of	current	
course
Associated	w/	bands	
outside	current	course X N/A
0 Remaining	Traffic • Traffic	within	sensor range Within	surveillance field	of	regard X N/A
Note:	used	‘unbuffered’	DWC	criteria
Alerting	&	Guidance	During	Preventive Threat	
-- No	LoDWC	Predicted	--
D1
D3
D2
ALT
9000ft
10000
11000
7000
8000
Altitude	TapeInner	Range	Ring
-05
ALT
9000ft
10000
11000
7000
8000
Altitude	TapeInner	Range	Ring
-05
ALT
9000ft
10000
11000
7000
8000
Altitude	TapeInner	Range	Ring
-05
*notional	encounter
Alerting	&	Guidance	During	Corrective Threat	
-- LoDWC	Predicted	<	55	sec --
D1
D3
D2
ALT
9000ft
10000
11000
7000
8000
Altitude	TapeInner	Range	Ring
-00
ALT
9000ft
10000
11000
7000
8000
Altitude	TapeInner	Range	Ring
-00
ALT
9000ft
10000
11000
7000
8000
Altitude	TapeInner	Range	Ring
00
*notional	encounter
Alerting	&	Guidance	During	Warning Threat	
-- LoDWC	Predicted	<	25	sec --
D1
D3
D2
ALT
9000ft
10000
11000
7000
8000
Altitude	TapeInner	Range	Ring
-00
ALT
9000ft
10000
11000
7000
8000
Altitude	TapeInner	Range	Ring
00
ALT
9000ft
10000
11000
7000
8000
Altitude	TapeInner	Range	Ring
00
*notional	encounter
Alerting	&	Guidance	During	Well	Clear	Recovery
-- LoDWC	Unavoidable --
D1
D3
D2
ALT
9000ft
10000
11000
7000
8000
Altitude	TapeInner	Range	Ring
00
ALT
9000ft
10000
11000
7000
8000
Altitude	TapeInner	Range	Ring
00
ALT
9000ft
10000
11000
7000
8000
Altitude	TapeInner	Range	Ring
-00
*notional	encounter
• Generic	MQ-9	Reaper
– Speed:
• Cruise:	110	knots
• Landing:	90-110	knots
• Max:	200	knots
• Min:	70	knots
– Default	Climb	Rate:	
• 1000ft/min
– Default	Descent	Rate:	
• 1000ft/min
– Roll:
• Max:	+/- 20°
• Rate:	5°/sec
– Pitch:
• Max:	+/- 10°
• Rate:	1°/sec
Aircraft	Flight	Model
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• Ground	control	station	(GCS)	contains:
1. DAA	Display	– traffic	&	alerting
2. Tactical	Situation	Display	(TSD)	– vehicle	control	interfaces	&	maps
3. Viewer	Tool	– contains	approach	plate	&	airport	facility	directory	(AFD)
4. Right	Panel	– landing	checklist	and	additional	info
5. Voice	communication	panel	– touchscreen,	transmit/receive	on	select	freqs.
Ground	Control	Station	(GCS)
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1 2 4
3
5
Vigilant	Spirit	Control	Station	(AFRL)
• Primary	=	Rwy14
• Runway	14/32
– Length	=	6000ft	x	150ft
– RNAV	(GPS)
• Elevation	=	129ft
• Traffic	Pattern	=	1150ft
• Downwind	offsets:
– Left	=	~1.5nm
– Right	=	~0.5nm
• Runway	20/02
– Not	used
Sonoma	County	Airport
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Traffic	Pattern	Altitude	=	1150ft
3NM		(WP1)	to	RW14	(WP2)	=	3nm
RW14	(WP2)	to	RW32	(WP3)		=	1nm
• Pseudo-pilots	monitored	and	managed	all	manned	traffic	(IFR	&	VFR)
– Multi-Aircraft	Control	System	(MACS)	software	suite
• Air	Traffic	Control	managed	UAS	and	manned	traffic
– Center	controller	managing	Oakland	Center	(ZOA	40/41)
– Tower	controller	managing	Santa	Rosa	(KSTS)
– Sector	traffic	modeled	using	real	sector	activity	and	data
• All	participants	communicated	via	push-to-talk	headsets
– Oakland	Center	frequency:	127.80
– KSTS	Tower	frequency:	118.50
– KSTS	ATIS:	120.55
Simulation	Components
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• Pilots	trained	first	on	the	ground	control	station	followed	by	training	on	the	
DAA	system
– Trained	on	the	meaning	of	each	alert/guidance	type	in	their	given	configuration
• Pilots	were	trained	last	on	how	to	fly	the	approach
• Informed	that:
– Phase	1	DAA	system	was	designed	to	assist	pilots	in	maintaining	DAA	well	clear	
during	transit/en	route	operations	in	Class	D,	E,	and	G	airspace
– A	Phase	2	DAA	system	is	being	developed	to	support	terminal	operations	and	
therefore:
• Phase	1	DAA	well	clear	definition	and	associated	alerting/guidance	may	or	may	not	be	
suitable	in	terminal	environments
v Told	to	use	the	DAA	system	at	their	discretion	to	conduct	safe	operations	
in	the	terminal	environment
Training	on	DAA	System
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• Participants	flew	3	different	types	of	approaches	into	Santa	Rosa	Rwy	14	
under	Instrument	Flight	Rules	(IFR)
– Instrument	(RNAV	GPS)	Approach
– “Visual”	Approach
– Traffic	Pattern
• Common	across	scenarios:
– Start	in	Vigilant	Spirit’s	HOLDS	mode	&	in	Oakland	center	airspace
– Coordinate	transfer	to	KSTS	Tower
– Perform	checklist	actions	as	able	(e.g.,	check	ATIS,	brief	approach)
– Fly	final	in	Vigilant	Spirit’s	NAV	mode	(enables	glide	slope)
Scenario	Design
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Scenario	Design
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Instrument	Approach	Notes:
• Final	approach	coarse	offset	15°
• Missed	approach	procedures	=	
climb	to	5000ft,	fly	runway	heading	
(140°)
“Visual”	Approach	Notes:
• Airport	“in	sight”	10-12nm	from	
runway
• Line	up	for	3nm	final	stabilized	
approach
• Traffic	pattern	@	1150ft
Pattern	Approach	Notes:
• Traffic	pattern	@	1150ft
• Controllers	will	give	pattern	entry	
instructions
• 45° entry,	mid-field	entry	or	direct	
base
• May	extend	downwind	and	call	your	
base	
• Offset	from	Rwy14	should	be	
~1.5nm
• Each	scenario	had	6	runs:
– 4	included	a	scripted	loss	of	DAA	well	clear	somewhere	along	approach:
• 2	scripted	to	occur	Early - before	final;	5-10nm	from	airport
• 2	scripted	to	occur	Late - on	final;	within	3nm	of	airport
– 2	included	no	scripted	conflict	but	interactions	with	traffic	around	airport	were	
expected
• Alerts	and	LoDWC	possible	due	to	size	of	DWC	definition	and	0.5nm	offset	of	right	
downwind	from	runway
Scenarios
17
• Participants
– 18	participants	(M =	38.5	years	of	age)
• All	had	manned	flying	experience	(M =	2200	hours)	and	were	IFR	rated
– Manned:	M	=	3000	hrs	in	civilian	airspace;	Unmanned:	M	=	1000	hrs	in	civilian	airspace
• ½	had	experience	with	unmanned	aircraft	(M =	1100	hours)
– 3	Air	Traffic	Control	confederates	
• 1	retired	tower	controllers	(Stockton)
• 2	retired	center	controllers	(Oakland	Center)
– 4	Pseudo	pilot	confederates	(current	general	aviation)
Participants
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RESULTS
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• 216	total	scripted	conflicts	(all	single-threat	encounters)
=	18	(pilots)	*	3	(scenarios	per	pilot)	*	4	(scripted	conflicts	per	scenario)	
• 536	intruders	registered	(in	truth)	as	DAA	preventive,	corrective	or	warning
– 40%	were	against	scripted conflicts
– 60%	were	against	unscripted conflicts
• Breakdown	of	(truth)	alert	types	generated	by	intruders:
Global	Statistics
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#	of	Unique	
Intruders DAA	Preventive DAA Corrective
DAA	
Warning
Scripted 210 147	(70%) 162	(77%) 191	(90%)
Unscripted 326 160	(49%) 215	(66%) 149	(46%)
NOTE:
“Truth”	alerts	=	actual	alert	level	registered	by	DAA	
system,	regardless	of	experimental	condition
• Results	centered	on	the	effect	of	display	configuration	and	location	of	
encounter
– Display	configuration	was	primary	IV
– Encounter	location	resulted	in	most	pronounced	results
• Early	=	before	final
• Late	=	on	final
• Unscripted	=	almost	exclusively	pattern	traffic	(similar	in	location	to	‘late’	encounters)
• Effects	of	pilot	background,	approach	type	and	trial	were	examined	but	not	
focus	of	this	presentation
– Metrics	where	they	had	noteworthy	effect	are	pointed	out
Notes
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RESPONSE	AND	ALERT	TIMES
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• Alert	levels	were	suppressed	in	D1	and	D2
– As	a	result	pilots	received	greater	number	of	DAA	Preventive	alerts	and	had	to	
interpret	if	they	were	a	legitimate	threat
• Slightly	fewer	(~10%)	DAA	Warning	(truth)	alerts	triggered	in	D3
Visible	Alerts
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D1 D2 D3
Visible Truth Visible Truth Visible Truth
Preventive 178 97 165 107 103 103
Corrective
128
(visible as 
preventive)
125
(visible as 
preventive)
124 124
Warning
119
(visible as 
preventive)
117 117 104 104
Visible	Alerts	(&	Truth	Alert)	by	Display	Configuration
• AC	RT	=	time	to	upload	maneuver	
following	alert	onset
• D1	condition	resulted	in	slower	
responses	to	both	corrective	and	
warning	alerts	(~	7-10sec)
– All	conditions	slower	than	was	observed	
in	Part	Task	6
• Slowest	AC	RT	when	responding	to	
encounters	on	final	in	Instrument	
Approach	scenario
• Slower	in	first	trial	of	day
Aircraft	Response	Time	(AC	RT)
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Corrective Warning
• 340	intruders	registered	as	DAA	Warning
– 29%	spent	0	time	as	DAA	Corrective
– 63%	spent	<	15	seconds	as	DAA	Corrective
• Late	and	Unscripted	encounters	most	likely	
to	spend	<	15	seconds	as	DAA	Corrective	
before	registering	as	DAA	Warning
Corrective	Alert	Durations
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63%		<	15s
46%		<	15s
70%		<	15s
SEPARATION	DATA
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• Proportion	of	losses	of	DAA	Well	Clear	(LoDWC)
– #	of	LoDWC	/	#	aircraft	that	generated	a	DAA	Corrective	or	Warning
• 176 total	LoDWC	/	472 total	DAA	Corrective	and/or	Warning	alerts	=	37%	overall
– Consistent	across	conditions	(34-39%)
• Alerted	traffic	most	likely	to	lead	to	LoDWC	when	occurring	late
– Much	smaller	number	of	unscripted	alerts	actually	led	to	LoDWC	(26/249)
Proportion	of	Losses	of	DAA	Well	Clear
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Proportion of LoDWC by Display Configuration
• SLoWC	=	%	of	the	DAA	well	clear	volume	(including	tau)	penetrated	by	intruder
– Higher	%	=	greater	penetration
• On	average,	D2	resulted	in	less	severe	LoDWC	(reduction	~6-8%)
• Late	encounters	consistently	resulted	in	more	severe	LoDWC
– Especially	pronounced	in	D1	condition
Loss	of	DAA	Well	Clear	Severity	(SLoWC)
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Avg. SLoWC by Display Configuration and Encounter Location
D1 D2 D3
• Median	SLoWC	generally	low	(<	20%)	across	display	configurations
• Median	rises	to	30%	for	late	encounters
– Median	<	15%	for	early	and	unscripted	encounters
• All	display	configurations	and	both	early	and	late	encounters	experienced	multiple	
high-severity	losses	of	DAA	well	clear	(>	50%)
Loss	of	DAA	Well	Clear	Severity	(SLoWC)
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SLoWC by Display Configuration SLoWC by Encounter Location
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• D2	showed	fewer	high-severity	LoDWC	than	D1	&	D3
• Late	encounters	resulted	in	disproportionate	#	of	high-severity	LoDWC
Loss	of	DAA	Well	Clear	Severity	(SLoWC)	>	50%
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Early Late UnscriptedD1 D2 D3
D1 D2 D3
SLoWC Above 50 10 (15%) 7 (12%) 11 (20%)
SLoWC Above 70 3 (5%) 1 (2%) 4 (7%)
Early Late Unscripted
SLoWC Above 50 9 (16%) 18 (20%) 1 (3%)
SLoWC Above 70 2 (3%) 6 (7%) 0
Worse
Better
Note:	60%	were	pilot	error;	40%	”too	slow” Note:	75%	”too	slow”	or	“no	maneuver”
• 60%	of	all	LoDWC	breached	the	horizontal	&	vertical	Phase	1	DWC	thresholds	
(discarding	tau	component)
– 13%	breached	CalAnalytics	terminal	area	DWC
Actual	Separation	at	CPA
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Legend:
Early
Late
Unscripted
NMAC CalAnalytics Phase 1 DWC
Early Late Unscripted Total
“Spatial” LoDWC 52% 72% 40% 105
“Cal” LoDWC 10% 18% 0 22
Total LoDWC 56 89 31 176
% of Early/Late/Unscripted LoDWC
• Display	configuration	smaller	effect	on	proportion	and	severity	of	LoDWC	
than	encounter	location
– Late	encounters	disproportionately	bad
– Unscripted	encounters	low	in	number	and	severity
• All	display	configurations	had	instances	of	high	severity	SLoWC	(>	50%)
– Slight	trend	of	less-severe	LoDWC	in	D2
– Most	were	due	to	pilot	error	(slow	responses	in	particular)
• 105	cases	of	‘spatial’	LoDWC	and	22	cases	using	CalAnalytics	criteria
– Unscripted	encounters	never	reached	CalAnalytics	volume
Separation	Results	Summary
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LoDWC	BREAKDOWN
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• Generally	clustered	around	final	with	handful	of	losses	during	transition	from	
Oakland	center	airspace	to	terminal	area
Intruder	Location	at	CPA	(For	All	LoDWC)
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• Majority	of	intruders	are	on	or	near	right	downwind
Intruder	Location	at	CPA	(For	All	LoDWC)
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Legend:
Instrument Approach
Visual Approach
Pattern Approach
Approx.	position	of	right	downwind	leg
Intruder	&	Own	Lat/Long
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Intruder	&	Own	Lat/Long
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Legend:
Intruder Position
Ownship Position
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• Encounters	designed	to	turn	directly	into	us	while	ownship	was	on	final	were	most	
likely	to	result	in	LoDWC	(97%)
• Encounters	with	a	head-on	KSTS	departure	while	ownship	was	on	final	were	most	
likely	to	result	in	“spatial”	LoDWC	(83%)
LoDWC	by	Encounter	Type
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Encounter	Type Encounter	Location %	LoDWC %	"Spatial"	LoDWC Total	Scripted
Turn	Into	Ownship Late 97% 63% 36
Departure Late 88% 83% 18
Overflight Late 72% 44% 18
Turn	in	Front Late 69% 47% 36
Overflight Early 61% 29% 54
Cut-Off (Base) Early 55% 38% 18
Parallel	Track Early 50% 22% 18
Departure Early 22% 11% 18
Late	Encounter	Examples
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Turn	Into	Ownship Turn	In	Front
#	of	LoDWC #	of "Spatial"	LoDWC
35	(97%) 23	(63%)
#	of	LoDWC #	of "Spatial"	LoDWC
25	(69%) 17	(47%)
Late	Encounter	Examples
41
KSTS	Departure Overflight	(Late)
#	of	LoDWC #	of "Spatial"	LoDWC
16	(88%) 15	(83%)
#	of	LoDWC #	of "Spatial"	LoDWC
13	(72%) 8	(44%)
Early	Encounter	Examples
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Overflight	(Early) Overflight	(Early)
#	of	LoDWC #	of "Spatial"	LoDWC
33	(61%) 16	(29%)
#	of	LoDWC #	of "Spatial"	LoDWC
33	(61%) 16	(29%)
• Instances	of	LoDWC	with	unscripted	encounters	most	often	happened	as	intruder	
was	on	right	downwind
– Intruders	turning	base	or	final	was	second	most	common	cause
• Ownship	was	typically	established	on	final	when	these	LoDWC	occurred
– Minority	occurred	when	ownship	was	turning	base/final	or	approaching	the	3nm	fix
Unscripted	LoDWC
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Intruder	Location #	LoDWC "Spatial"	LoDWC
Downwind 13 6	(46%)
Turning	(Base or	Final) 10 3	(30%)
On	Final 4 3	(75%)
On	Base 2 1	(50%)
Approaching	Final 1 0
Jet	Traffic 1 0
TOTAL 31 11
• Pilot	error	accounted	for	63%	of	LoDWC
– Most	common	cause	of	LoDWC	was	the	pilot	
responding	too	slowly
• Late	acceleration	(<	15sec	to	LoDWC	at	first	alert)	
2nd most	common	cause
• D1	resulted	in	greatest	number	of	slow responses
– D2	resulted	in	fewer	slow	responses	against	late	
encounters	than	D1	and	D3
Causes	of	LoDWC
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LoDWC Category Total
Pilot 
Responsible
Too Slow 34%
Ineffective Maneuver 11%
Return Too Soon 9%
Turned Base/Final Too Soon 5%
No Maneuver 2%
Secondary Cause by Pilot 2%
Pilot Not
Responsible
Late Acceleration 33%
Pattern Activity 5%
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• LoDWC	occurred	near	final,	and	specifically	alongside	right	downwind
– Turns	directly	into	ownship	on	final	and	a	departure	were	most	likely	encounter	
types	to	progress	to	LoDWC
– Right	downwind	traffic	was	the	biggest	cause	of	LoDWC	against	unscripted	
intruders
• 2/3	of	LoDWC	a	result	of	slow	pilot	response	or	late	acceleration	(both	
more	common	with	late	encounters)
LoDWC	Results	Summary
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MANEUVERING	&	ATC	INTEROPERABILITY
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• Pilots	resolved	most	maneuvers	with	heading	changes
– Late	encounters	resulted	in	more	altitude	and	speed	changes	than	early	
encounters
Maneuver	Preferences
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• 2	flights	into	terrain	occurred	during	data	collection	runs
– Both	occurred	during	“visual”	approach	scenario	where	pilots	descended	to	pattern	
altitude	early
• Tower	raised	concern	with	number	of	360s	&	turns	made	near	runway
– Much	more	common	among	pilots	with	unmanned	experience	and	flying	visual	approach
Maneuver	Characteristics
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• Receiving	ATC	approval	was	rare,	regardless	of	condition
– Slightly	more	frequent	when	returning	to	course
– Far	less	common	than	PT6
• Initial	Approval	=	#	of	initial	maneuvers	with	approval	from	ATC	/	#	of	total	maneuvers	made
• Return	Approval	=	#	of	returns	to	course	with	approval	from	ATC	/	#	of	total	returns	to	course
ATC	Coordination
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• After	each	encounter,	tower	controller	answered	the	following	questions:
• Tower	rated	UAS	behavior	as	overwhelmingly	appropriate
– Rated	‘inadequate’	separation	typically	when	SLoWC	>	50%
– Unnecessary	maneuvers	were	noted	typically	identified	when	pilot	disrupted	pattern	
sequencing
– Communications	was	the	most	common	issue	(primarily	not	receiving	advisory	from	pilot	
on	traffic	or	maneuver)
Tower	Controller	Feedback
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1. In	this	encounter	did	the	UAS	pilot	
maintain	adequate	separation?
2. Did	the	UAS	pilot	maneuver	
unnecessarily	for	the	encounter?
3. Were	there	issues	with	UAS	pilot	
communication?
• Heading	maneuvers	most	common,	more	altitude/speed	changes	against	
late	and	unscripted	encounters
• Major	maneuver	issues	were	flights	into	terrain	and	360s/turns	near	
runway
• UAS	actions	largely	rated	appropriate	by	tower
– Tower	often	called	out	cases	with	SLoWC	>	50%	&	unnecessary	turns	near	
pattern
– Lack	of	coordination	biggest	issue	raised	by	Tower
ATC	Interoperability	Results	Summary
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• Phase	1	DAA	Well	Clear	Definition
– Pilots	had	a	hard	time	judging	when	a	maneuver	was	necessary	to	avoid	high-
severity	LoDWC
• None	above	30%	in	PT6
• 17	>	50%	SLoWC;	6	>	70%	due	to	pilot	error	(slow	responses	most	common)
• Display	Configuration
– Modest	benefits	for	D2
• D1	resulted	in	slower	average	pilot	response	times	and	twice	as	many	LoDWC	caused	
by	slow	responses	compared	to	D2
• D3	had	greatest	proportion	of	high-severity	LoDWC
– Utility	of	corrective	alert	diminished	near	airport
• Most	Warning	alerts	either	had	no	prior	Corrective	or	Corrective	<	15s
• Encounter	Location
– Late	encounters	responsible	for	most	LoDWC
– LoDWC	with	unscripted	encounters	were	low	in	frequency	and	severity
• Additional
– LoDWC	typically	resulted	from	pilot	hesitation	and	late	acceleration
– Pilot	rated	well	by	ATC	across	the	board	with	a	few	exceptions
• E.g.,	rate	of	coordination,	excessive	maneuvering	around	final,	flights	into	terrain
Conclusion
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• Purpose:	measure	performance	of	DAA	system	using	terminal-specific	DAA	
well	clear	definitions
• Lessons	learned	to	be	leveraged	in	follow-on	experiment
– Removing	pattern	approach	&	early	encounters	from	experimental	design
– Fewer	scripted	encounters
• Proposed	IV’s:
– Terminal	DAA	Well	Clear	candidate	definitions:
• AFRL:	Horizontal	=	0.2nm	(~1215ft),	Vertical	=	±450ft,	no	Tau
• Langley:	TBD
– Alert	structure:	with	vs.	without	DAA	Corrective
• Data	collection	begins	26	JANUARY
Terminal	Operations	HITL	1b
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